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Problems of access to land 
Land contracts and traditional tenure 
Sandra Fullerton Joireman * 
Land policy and land use in Ethiopia have been controversial issues since the 
reign of Haile Sellassie. During the Imperial era, the conflict over land policy 
surrounded gull, tenancy arrangements in the South, and land reform. After the 
revolution, and the subsequent and equally revolutionary land reform, the key 
issue in land policy became redistribution of land and the diminunization of land 
holdings. Now in the post-Dergue era, the Ethiopian government has yet another 
opportunity to make a large scale reform of land use and land policy in Ethiopia. 
The future tenure system must address the recurrent themes in Ethiopian land 
conflicts of security and access to Jar.cl. 
The goal of this project is to identify the current day policy implications of 
a traditional tenure system, rist or risti, with particular reference to the types of 
contractual agreements that existed under that system. In order to achieve this, 
the paper will begin with a reference to the importance of understanding the 
traditional systems of land tenure. Then, a brief description of the data set and 
available information will be given, followed by the preliminary results of the 
data and a description of the kinds of contractual arrangements found under the 
traditional system. This will be followed by a discussion of the policy 
implications. 
Why study traditional forms of land tenure? 
There are several reasons why an understanding of the rist and risti systems 
of land tenure is helpful in deveioping future policy options with regard to land 
holding regimes. The first and most obvious reason is that the rist system in 
many areas of the country was the main form of land holding before the 
revolution and, as such, it infonns the experience of the peasantry, many of 
whom recall it well. It must be remembered that the revolution in Ethiopia was 
only 20 years ago. If a man begins farming at 18 this means that every man 38 
and above, the respected and the elders of the community, will have had some 
experience of the traditional tenure arrangements. Interviews done in rist areas 
support this fact. Therefore, it behooves us to examine the traditional forms of 
tenure as they compose part of the option, set of land tenure systems, and effect 
the expectations and demands of the peasantry. 
• From: Institute of Development Research, Addis Ababa University and UCLA 
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Secondly, looking at the traditional tenure system over a period of years 
allows us to examine how tenure institutions adjust to changes in environmental 
factors such as population increase, drought and the development of a market. 
If we observe in the traditional tenure system a change over time in the 
contractual arrangements that are involved, the system's of allocation of land, or 
the type of inheritance arrangements allowed, it will be indicative of the fact 
that the changing environment demands different adaptive responses by the 
tenure system. This demonstrates the needed flexibility of tenure arrangements 
to allow the land system to adapt to change. If there are variations in 
fundamental institutional arrangements over time in response to changing 
environmental factors, any land policies which develop should emulate those 
changes and thereby allow the tenure system to legally adapt to the changing 
environmental factors which affect the farmers. The importance of implementing 
a system which allows this kind of flexibility cannot be overemphasized, 
particularly in a country like Ethiopia where agriculture composes approximately 
80% of all economic activity. 
Anthropological studies of rist tenure systems 
-
The rist or risti systems of land holding can be found throughout the highland 
plateau of Ethiopia in the regions of Northern Shoa, Gojjam, parts of Wallo and 
parts of Tigray. There can be significant variations from region to region in 
exactly how the rist or risti system operates. Several anthropological studies have 
been conducted which either center on the traditional form of land tenure called 
rist or risti, or at least give reference to it. The most important of these is Allan 
Hoben' s 1973 book, Land Tenure among the Amhara of Ethiopia1, a study of the 
Dega Damot area of Gojjam which gives an in depth description of the rist 
system. 
Hoben finds that in the rist system of Dega Damot land was held by the 
hereditary right of the Amhara people. At the same time, he notes that almost 
half the fields in his study were acquired from people who were not parents of 
those who held the fields. Hoben2 also found that there was a considerable 
amount of litigation over rist land rights in the government and local courts. He 
sees the decision as to which court was chosen as a strategic move on the part 
of the litigants. He finds in his study that powerful people were more likely to 
gain access to land because they " ... can influence judges, and sustain the costs 
of litigation". Several other studies, such as those of Bauer3, Messing4, and 
Weissleder5 have been done of the rist and risti tenure systems in Ethiopia in 
78 
Problems of access to land 
Tigray, Gondar and Shoa respectively. These studies are also anthropological in 
nature and, like Hoben's, concentrate on small geographical areas. 
The studies all come to at least a few similar conclusions with regard to the 
rist system. First of all, they agree that the rist or risti inheritance based systems 
can vary from region to region. For instance, whereas in Dega Damot a person's 
rist land means all of the land that he has a potential claim on, in Ankober a 
similar term refers to a specific plot. The studies all agree that in rist and risti 
tenure systems land is generally not sold. In his study of Ankober, a woreda 
within Tegulet and Bulga Awraja, Weissleder saw a variety of contractual 
arrangements and also noted that though a person might say they can sell their 
rist land, in reality they may not have had full right to do so without permission 
from someone else6 • One cannot draw exact conclusions from any of these 
studies, or from the others that exist regarding the traditional tenure systems. It 
is not the intent of this paper to suggest that all rist and risti systems are 
identical to that found in Tegulet and Bulga. However, adaptability in one area 
of rist holding is indicative of adaptive arrangements in others. 
Tegulet and Bulga Awraja 
Tegulet and Bulga Awraja is an area that was not entirely rist tenure before 
the revolution. It was a mixed tenure system composed of rist land and a large 
amount of property rental gebbar land, or land which is privately farmed and 
usually rented from large land owners or owned by the orthodox church (samon 
land). Additionally, there was limited rental from large landowners, some of 
whom were members of the royal family. The rist lands were found in the old 
area of Tegulet which was the woredas of Moret and Werana in the Imperial 
administration. As a mixed system of tenure there are some drawbacks to 
studying it instead of an area such as Menz which was entirely rist. 
First, as stated above, this awraja cannot be thought to be representative of 
traditional tenure systems as a whole, or even of all rist systems, but merely 
indicative of the possible arrangements which might develop within a certain 
system. Secondly, any results that are demonstrated may be due, in part, to the 
interaction of the separate systems of land tenure. For instance, we might find 
more instances of land rentals among Amharas in Tegulet and Bulga because 
people with rist lands are able to rent from neighbors or nearby woredas where 
the dominant form of tenure is tenancy or gebbar land. 
At the same time this mingling of tenures can be seen as advantageous 
because it allows us to contrast tenure arrangements in such close proximity that 
the geographical endowments will be similar as well as climactic variation. 
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Additionally, it allows us to view not only what is happening within each tenure 
system, but also what occurs when the two or three are adjacent to each other. 
Since this is often what happened, it is not necessarily problematic but perhaps 
representative of certain areas. 
The data in the court cases shows that Amharas made up approximately 85% 
of the actors and Oromos approximately 15%. These are rough approximations 
of the ethnic composition of the area based on the numbers of each ethnic group 
participating in judicial actions. 
Data collection and methodology 
The data set consists of awraja court records from the years 1934, 1937, 
1960, 1961 and 1966 Ethiopian Calendar. The record sets are not complete for 
any of the years except 1934 and the 1934 records do not include decisions or 
where the cases originated so they are only of limited use. All records from these 
years were collected regardless of their subject matter. The only cases excluded 
were those filed separately regarding proof of lineage. It should be noted that the 
research was begun with the intent of collecting data from the years 1939, 1949, 
1959 and 1966, yet most of these records were either lost or no longer on the 
premises of the awraja court. Because of the limited availability of the data a 
standard random sampling was not conducted. 
It should be noted that due to the jurisdictional limitations of the courts, most 
of the land cases heard in the awraja courts involved large parcels of land. 
Before the revolution the awraja court was empowered to hear cases concerning 
immovable property worth 1000 birr or more. However, the awraja courts also 
heard appeals from the woreda courts which could hear any case for immovable 
property that did not exceed 1,000 birr. Woreda cases in the sample ranged from 
5 birr all the way to the upper threshold of 1,000 birr. Approximately half of the 
cases in the data set are woreda cases on appeal to the awraja courts. 
As stated, the data set collected is not a series of consecutive years but rather, 
an attempt to get a sample over time. Therefore, what emerged was a sample 
consisting of the following years and cases: 36 cases from 1937, the first year 
full case records are available, 64 cases from 1960 and 1961, which are 
combined, and 147 cases from 1966, the last year before the revolution. It will 
be noted when the cases are weighted and when they are simply reported in 
percentages for that year. It must be remembered that a case from 193 7 will have 
greater weight in influencing its yearly percentages than a case from 1966 if 
they are not subjected to a weighting procedure. 
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Data was collected on the nature of the case, the decision, the value of the 
property, the date and location of the origin of the suit, the parties involved and 
a set of characteristics associated with each party. In addition to the court records 
collected, interviews were conducted with lawyers who had practiced litigation 
under the traditional system and with those elderly residents who were able to 
remember the rist system well or the other systems of land tenure in the 
surrounding area. These interviews were used to corroborate empirical evidence 
gathered from the court records and to clear up confusion with regard to specific 
legal terminology and existing local contractual arrangements. 
Preliminary findings 
Frequency of land cases 
Preliminary findings with regard to land cases demonstrate that over all the 
years, cases over land make up 76% of all cases examined. The specific 
breakdown by year of the percentage of cases in each year that have to do with 
land is as follows: 
Table I: Land Cases as a Percentage of Total Cases Each Year 
Year E.c· Year G.C. Number of Land Cases Percent of Total 
1937 1944/45 29/36 80.6 
1960 1967/68 49/64 76.6 
1966 1974175 110/144 74.8 
Note: The Ethio ian Calendar is seven or ei 'ht ears behinc. 'P g y the Gre orian calendar g 
depending on the time of year. 
It should be noted that the data for the year 1934 show a similarly large 
percentage of land cases. Additionally, the 1934 data indicate that in one year a 
single individual might be involved in up to six court cases over land in a single 
year. This is particularly interesting in that it seems to correspond with the 
information that Hoben found in Dega Damot that a powerful individual might 
make substantial efforts to gain extra land through litigation. 
Hoben and others who have studied the rist system have indicated the extreme 
number of land cases in the court system as a way of asserting influence or as 
a type of cultural tradition. This may well be the case, but the expenditure of 
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time and money on the reallocation of land rights also has other effects. 
Significant amounts of litigation over land rights lead to a net welfare loss to the 
society through a decrease in the amount of production that can take place and 
by effecting the security of holdings. The net capacity of the society to produce 
and sustain extra people is reduced when land is left fallow and work hours are 
absorbed in the pursuit of litigation. This is particularly true if land remains 
unproductive or unrented during the period the land is under dispute7• In 
Ethiopian cases over land, the court would often order a stay of execution to 
prevent anyone from using a particular plot of land while it was the subject of 
a dispute8• If the land cases were short this would not be such a significant 
issue, but they were often not. The average duration of land cases in Tegulet and 
BulgaAwraja was one year in 1937, but by 1960 and 1961 the average was over 
two years. It is impossible to get an average for cases begun in 1966 because of 
the nationalization of land. These estimates tend to be low since many of the 
cases did not have end dates on them so they were simply considered as being 
completed in the year that they were brought. Evidence from land cases brought 
before the high court in Addis Ababa indicates that land cases can go on for six 
years or longer if they are appealed. J-Ph. Platteau, in an article on Land Rights 
in Sub-Saharan Africa9, identifies rising disputes over ownership and incr~asing 
costs of litigation, as well as a demand for more specific and secure property 
rights, as one of the indicators of induced or spontaneous change in a system of 
property rights. He also notes the problem of efficiency losses in the rural 
economy as a result of a high degree of litigation over land. , 
Given all of this information from the court records and from the experience 
of other countries in Africa, we can begin to view the emergence of extensive 
litigation over land rights as something more than tradition, as a factor indicative 
of a system of land tenure in transition. The transition is from a traditional, 
communal society where the need to delineate land rights was not as crucial to 
a more complex society, better integrated into the market and the money 
economy where the existence of communal property was still supported, but there 
was a demand for more flexibility of contracts and specification of rights. 
Variety of contractual agreements 
The land cases examined ranged in their nature from disputes over land sales 
to the payment of rents and the ubiquitous cases on inheritance. Toward the end 
of the period studied there also appeared a significant number of cases over 
money and lending agreements, which demonstrates a growing cash economy. 
However, early on, the cases that developed were almost entirely disputing land 
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allocation, land usurpation and the fruits of a certain plot of land. These cases 
give evidence of a wide variety of contractual agreements that existed in the rist 
tenure system and the surrounding areas. The two most interesting types of 
contracts found were land sales that existed in the rist system and particular types 
of land rentals which took place only in rist areas. These will each be considered 
in turn. 
First of all, contrary to most perceptions of the traditional tenure system, data 
collected indicate that the rist tenure system, at least in Tegulet and Bulga, did 
allow for the possibility of land sales. Weissleder notes this fact in his 
dissertation research on Ankober10, though Allan Hoben does not find the same 
evidence of sales in the Dega Damot area of Gojjam. 
There may be several reasons for this divergence of findings. First of all, the 
area under consideration in this particular study was an entire awraja over a 
period of approximately 30 years. This is a far larger area than that considered 
in most anthropological studies which concentrate on small areas. Secondly, land 
sales outside of the lineage simply were not that common in the rist system; 
therefore, a longer time horizon and a larger sample may be needed in order to 
discover their existence. 
According to the records examined in Tegulet and Bulga, and a number of 
old peasants who were interviewed, a rist holder did have the right to sell his 
land, but with certain restrictions. In the Moret and Werana area11 , which was 
predominantly rist, those who found themselves no longer able to farm their 
traditional land and wanted to sell it would first try to sell their land to their 
family members. If they were able to sell land to their family members it was not 
often brought before the court; therefore, we have no official record of this type 
of sale, only the oral testimony of those who recall the process. That, by no 
means implies that these types of land sales within a lineage did not occur, as 
there is evidence of peasants going on to the second step of selling their land to 
outsiders. 
In order to sell land to outsiders, a rist holder had to get a document signed 
by the members of his lineage stating that they were unable to buy the land from 
the holder and that he or she could sell it outside the lineage. It is contestations 
of this document which appear in the court records as evidence of land sale. 
Specifically, cases over land ownership arise where the defendant will claim to 
have bought the land and the plaintiff will say that he or she is not a blood 
relative and therefore has no right to the land. If the person bringing the suit for 
the land did not sign the paper and can prove his or her lineage12, they can easily 
win the case. The threat of another relative surfacing to contest a land sale makes 
the purchase of rist land a risky endeavor. To further add to the risk, laws of 
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proscription, or a statute of limitation on the amount of time after a sale when 
it can be contested, are invalid regarding inherited land13 • Yet, again, this does 
not mean that no sales occurred, it simply means that they were risky and 
because of this fact other compensatory measures were most likely taken such 
as selling the land at a lower price than its true worth as freehold property. 
As stated above there are really two layers of contractual agreements at which 
a land sale may occur. The first being the land sale within the family or lineage, 
which would be obscured from any official records, and the second, land sale to 
an outsider. This second sale can be empirically substantiated if it is contested 
at any point within the formal legal system. In fact this is what happened in 
several cases of our data set. In the entire sample that was examined 9.3% of 
the cases involved some sort of land sale, or a reference to a land sale entered 
into the dispute. The distribution by woreda is as follows 14: 
In the combined rist areas of Moret and Werana, land sales were evident in 
11.8% of the cases. This can be compared. with the whole awraja sale rate of 
9.3%. As noted, this may be explained by the fact that the largest town in the 
awraja, Debre Berhan, was located in Werana. However, when we compare this 
rate with that of Sidama Awraja, where a similar study was conducted, we find 
that Sidama had only 4.5% of the cases demonstrating evidence of land sales. 
This is particularly interesting in that sales were not restricted in any way in 
Sidama, but they were in the Northern rist areas. 
The second significant type of land contract that was found in the awraja were 
rental contracts. These consisted of two types. One, which was share rental along 
the lines of what has traditionally been reported in studies of Ethiopian land 
tenure: ekul and irbo arash contracts mainly taking place on church or samon 
land. The other contractual arrangement is something called Yequm Wurse, or 
"bequeathment before death" that, according to interviews, existed only among 
the Amharas holding traditional, inherited land. 
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Table 2: Land Sales in Tegulet and Bulga Awraja 
Year 
Woreda 1944/45 1967/68 1974175 Total 
All Woredas 7 (19.4) 4 (6.3) 12 (8.2) 23 (9.3) 
Ankober 1 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (15.4) 3 (15.0) 
Asagirt 1 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (33.3) 2 (25.0) 
Basso 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Golela 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Kesem 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Kimbibit 1 (14.3) 1 (12.5) 3 (12.5) 5 (12.8) 
Moret 0 (0.0) 1 (5.6) 2 (8.3) 8 (18.2) 
Werana 4 (66.7) 2 (14.3) 2 (8.3) 8 (18.2) 
Unknown 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (9.7) 3 (8.3) 
Note: I. Percenta es are iven in g g p arentheses. 
2. The large number of cases in Werana woreda is due to the fact that Debre 
Berhan town, the largest in the Awraja, was located within that woreda. 
lrbo arash was a contractual agreement wherein the tenant pays a tithe or tax 
and after that splits the harvest with the landlord giving the landlord 114 of the 
crop and keeping 3/4 for himself. Ekul is similar to irbo in that a tithe is taken 
from the crop, but after that the harvest is divided on a fifty-fifty basis. It is 
unknown in the Tegulet and Bulga Awraja just what inputs were required by 
which people. However, we do know that in other areas such as Arsi, in an ekul 
arash contract the share cropper was given the seed, oxen, and implements from 
the landowner15 • With the other dominant types of share holding which required 
a lesser proportion of the crop to go to the land owner the contributions by the 
landowner were also significantly lower. Tht:se types of share holding agreements 
could take place among Oromos or Amharas, but it is not possible to determine 
if they existed on rist land. However, it is quite certain that the following type 
of share holding agreement Yequm Wurse, did exist and only on the rist land. 
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Yequm Wurse, or bequeathment before death, was a practice by which 
traditional, inherited, rist land was passed on to a person's heirs before a person 
actually died. According to informants this practice strictly followed the 
genealogical line. Consequently, the land would not be rented out to any 
non-relation. If persons holding rist land found themselves somehow 
incapacitated, or unable to farm their land for other reasons they might resort to 
this arrangement to sustain themselves. In practice, the land was given to one's 
heirs and then those heirs were required to pay a specified rent to the actual 
owner of the land until that person's death. The rent was most often a type of 
share contract. This type of contractual agreement was strictly held up by the 
courts, though there is no direct mention of it in codified law. A substantial 
number of cases appear in which a plaintiff brings a defendant to court for 
failure to pay the specified rent or share percentage. Because the contracts were 
most often share cropping arrangements, they appear as cases over the "fruits of 
the land" or, the share of the harvest. 
Yequm Wurse is particularly meaningful in that it allows rist holders an 
alternative to land sales or farming the land themselves. The percentages of total 
cases over the fruits of the land shows a significant fluctuation over time. In 
193 7 the percentage of cases over fruits of the land is 8% for the awraja. It is 
also 8% for the years 1960 and 1961. However, by the time of the revolution it 
jumps to 14% of all cases. 
In Moret and Werana woredas, the rist areas in the study, the composition of 
cases was slightly different than in non-rist areas. There were the greatest 
percentage of Amhara verses Amhara cases and the largest total number of cases 
over land. During the earliest years of the sample in Moret and Werana woredas 
there were very few instances of anything other than inheritance cases. By 1960 
we begin to see the emergence of cases over fruits of land and usurpation. By 
the end of the sample time, both Moret and Werana had land cases over trespass, 
rental agreements, sales, usurpation and boundaries and substantially less frequent 
disputes over inheritance. 
This change in the nature of disputes over time seems to indicate that the area 
was experiencing a significant transition from what we typically think of as the 
traditional rist system where all land allocation occurred on the basis of 
inheritance, to a system that we might think of as a more modern rist system, 
one that incorporated a wider range of land contracts and land use patterns. The 
specific causes of this institutional change are beyond the scope of this paper, but 
conjecture would point to the development of a cash economy, which is 
substantiated in the data, as well as an increase in population. 
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Different contractual arrangements over land in the rist areas demonstrate 
several things. First, there was a substantial degree of flexibility which existed 
in the rist tenure system in terms of what sort of arrangements regarding the use 
of land could be made. These contractual arrangements seem to expand over time 
to include share contracts and rentals as well as inheritance and, in the rare 
instance, sale. Secondly, peasants were making contractual arrangements that 
were not sanctioned by law. There is a restriction in the old penal code, that is 
cited below, on entering into contracts over rist land without the formal approval 
of a judge who can certify that the transaction actually took place. 
Any man who sells his inherited land, alters it, gives it away or hands it 
over to another person without having the transaction written down by the 
judge who has authority in that district shall pay a fine from 100 to 2000 
dollars; and their agreement is invalid and nuW 6• 
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Table 3: Nature of Disputes in Tegulet and Bulga Awraja 
I II Moret II Werana II Non-Rist I 
Nature of Dispute 1944 1967 1974 1944 1967 1974 1944 1967 1974 
Land Inheritance 2 4 3 9 3 I 16 IO 13 
Boundary 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 
Rent 0 I I 2 I I 2 2 5 
Usurpation 7 6 2 2 4 6 II 9 19 
Trespass 0 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 4 
Sale 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Ownership 0 0 0 0 I 0 7 7 4 
Fruits 0 3 2 0 I 2 7 5 7 
Other 0 I 0 -0 I 0 0 I I 
Money Loan 0 0 0 0 0 I 2 0 6 
Theft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Rent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Contractual Dispute 0 3 I 0 I I 0 2 4 
Taxes 0 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 I 
Divorce 0 I 0 0 3 0 2 2 2 
Theft Property 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Other 0 I I 0 I I 9 7 3 
Note: Cases have been subjected to a weight mg procedure by year to compensate for the 
different sample sizes. 
Verification of contract was never mentioned by the peasants that we 
interviewed, though that does not mean that it never took place. However, it is 
quite reasonable to assume that peasants did not confirm every bequeathment 
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before a judge and that they saw no need to confirm this particular arrangement 
of Yequm Wurse because it was identical to simply passing ones land on to one's 
heirs. The fact that this contractual arrangement is not identified in any legal 
code, criminal or civil, is indicative of the fact that legal rights often did not 
conform to the practical rights exercised by the peasants in the countryside. The 
1960 Civil Code further identified the fact that no land sales would be allowed. 
Article 1493 forbids a community from alienating its land in any way without 
specific permission from the Ministry of Interior. There are more than likely 
additional examples for non-rist areas of a lack of correspondence between de 
Jure and de facto property rights. Yet, we can see from the data that not only did 
illegal land contracts occur, they were also brought before the courts for 
clarification. 
Classification of property rights 
Property rights regimes, or systems of land holding, can be classified into 
categories based on the rights given and obligations required under each system. 
The categories used here are borrowed from Daniel Bromley17, but they are 
representative of similar categorizations of rights that exist in other places. 
Bromley divides categories of property rights into four: state property regimes, 
private property regimes, common property regimes, and non property regimes. 
Each of these regimes is categorized by a certain stream of rights and 
obligations. 
A state property regime is, obviously, one in which the state controls all 
access and use rights. Individuals under this system have a duty to observe these 
rights. The extent of state control depends on the circumstances. In some cases 
the state may prohibit inheritance and usu_fruct rights to land passed back to the 
state upon the death of the person farming the land. In all cases the state controls 
the contractual agreements which control access to land. The farmer, however, 
still has the right to choose which crops to grow and may have the right to 
improve land through investments such as trees. 
Private property regimes are those in which individuals own land, to which 
they hold title. These individuals have the right to buy and sell land, rent land, 
bequeath land to whom they choose, select their crops and farming methods and 
invest in their land. They have a duty to use the land in a socially acceptable 
fashion and not disobey any laws. The particular characteristic of this regime is 
that an individual, or single owner, decides what should be done with the 
land. 
Common property regimes are those in which an individual is not free to 
determine what should be done with the land. Instead those decisions are made 
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by a group of people who are co-owners of the land. In the case of the rist 
system, these decisions are made by a lineage. In a common property regime an 
individual may have the right to choose the crops that they plant, but most other 
decisions revert back to the group of co-owners. Admission to a common 
property regime is usually restricted by membership in a certain group such as 
a clan, lineage or ethnic group 
The last property regime is that of non-property. This refers to an area of land 
in which there is no defined group of owners, and anyone can take advantage of 
the resources on the land. This has also been referred to as an open-access 
regime since admission is not restricted in any way. 
Each of these property regimes is characterized by a particular stream of 
rights. In Tegulet and Bulga Awraja we can identify the particular stream of 
rights available to the rist holders. However, it must be made clear that the de 
facto rights held by the rist holders did not correspond entirely with the de Jure 
rights. A certain amount of slippage is apparent between rights declared by law 
in the rist system and rights practiced in fact. The court records and interviews 
demonstrate the following bundle of rights available to rist holders in Tegulet 
and Bulga: 
- The right to choose crops 
- The right to plant trees and invest 
- The right to rent land 
- The right to enter into Jong-term contractual arrangements 
- The right to bequeath land to children 
- The right to exclude certain parties from inheritance 
- The right to sell land with the permission of the lineage 
Clearly, some of these rights seem more characteristic of a private property 
system than of a communal property regime. Yet, the restrictions on sale make 
the rist system fit more into the communal regime than private. Therefore, it is 
incorrect to characterize the rist tenure system as private or freehold tenure. 
Eventhough peasants may have referred to their land as their personal property, 
they were not free to dispose of it as they saw fit without permission from the 
lineage or an outside legal authority depending on the region. 
The code makes it clear that an individual was not free to make decisions 
regarding investment, bequeathment and sale on his/her own. Instead, according 
to the law, any decision of this type had to be specifically noted by the legal 
establishment in order to insure its validity, or approved by the Ministry of 
Interior, and this must be after approval from the lineage has been given. The 
necessity of legal acknowledgement is clear from the court records that exist, as 
people were often found suing each other in the courts over inheritance and 
bequeathment or land sale. Additionally, there was no statute of limitation or 
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right of proscription regarding rist land. A person could at any time contest a 
sale, bequeathment or boundary regardless of when it was made. 
Policy implications 
Research on the traditional land tenure system in Ethiopia yields several 
interesting conclusions with regard to instituting a land tenure policy for the state 
of Ethiopia. The first and least interesting of which is the simple fact that the 
traditional form of land tenure displayed all of those rights associated with a 
communal system and, as time progressed, entered a period of transition in which 
a demand for more control over property resources, as demonstrated by the 
increasing number of share contracts. The state system of land rights imposed by 
the Dergue by no means approximated the range of choices available to farmers 
under the traditional system, nor would any other property rights regime that 
took more rights away from the farmers than they had under the traditional 
system. When implementing a system of property rights, it is more important to 
look at the actual stream of rights available to a farmer than to its particular 
appellation as communal, state, or private property. 
Additionally, it must be remembered that the rist tenure system, and 
traditional tenure systems in general, was characterized by multiple contractual 
arrangements with regard to land allocation and a flexibility of choices with 
regard to land use. The traditional view of the rist holder in Northern Shoa with 
a plot of land that has been in his family for years and which he would die 
before selling, is simply a glorification of the peasantry. Certainly peasants are 
attached to their land, no one would dispute that fact, but even in rist areas there 
were land sales and these sales were sanctioned by the lineage. When would a 
lineage choose to sanction a sale of their traditional land? It would almost 
certainly be in a situation of severe need, when no one could take it upon 
themselves to either buy the land from the person selling it, or support that 
person until they were on firmer footing. This indicates the fact that the 
traditional tenure system was flexible when necessity demanded it. This is 
consistent with assessments of other traditional tenure systems in Africa. 
Likewise, the rist system supported other contractual arrangements that 
allowed land rentals to take place when a person was physically incapacitated, 
or otherwise unable to farm for himself. Too often, the understanding which 
peasants have of their land and the economic environment in which they operate 
is underestimated. What we see in an investigation of the rist system is that the 
peasants seemed to be making very careful assessments of their need and forming 
the appropriate contracts in response to that need. They were behaving in a way 
consistent with the economic and demographic pressures which they faced. 
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The flexibility of the rist tenure system is indicative of what future policy 
options should aim to attain. In the rist traditional tenure systems there were a 
variety of contractual arrangements that allowed peasants to hold on to their land 
when they were no longer able to farm due to some contingency. They were also 
able to sell their land in cases of extreme need with the permission of the 
lineage. This was advantageous in two ways. First, it allowed those who could 
not farm a way of sustaining themselves through income from rents or sales. 
Secondly, it allowed for farmers or families who were doing well or in need of 
more land to acquire it through rental or purchase. 
A flexible contractual environment allows peasants to cope with uncertainty 
and change. It also allows them to adapt in the face of population pressure, 
climatic changes and drought, and demographic changes such as urbanization. A 
policy which rigidly allocates a certain piece of land to an individual and allows 
that person no choice ih what to do with the land does not provide a contractual 
environment which is conducive to adaptation. This is particularly important in 
Ethiopia, where population is increasing at such a rate that in some areas of the 
country periodic land reallocation to those coming of age, as happened during 
the Dergue government, is a recipe for agricultural deterioration. 
Finally, and perhaps most telling is the fact that no matter what the 
government's decision is with regard to land policy, peasants will develop 
flexible contractual arrangements. The question is whether they will do it legally 
or illegally. Even in the rist system we see a slippage between what the legal 
requirements were, and what contractual arrangements took place. This is 
particularly interesting because the legal codes referring to the rist system were 
not made to change it, but simply to codify its conventions18 • Therefore we can 
see between the point of codification and the cases that reach the court before the 
revolution, that there has been a certain degree of change and transition in the 
way the rist system operated. The difference between de Jure and de facto rights 
may not concern the government to a great degree, but if there is a substantial 
difference between the two in the future we will see again the encumbering of 
the court system with land cases and the ensuing welfare loss that accompanies 
it. It would be a far better strategy for the government to seek to develop a 
contractual environment for the peasantry that gives them the land rights which 
they demand. Then the state can allocate, sustain and adjudicate land rights and 
contracts in a manner that promotes the well being of the farmer. 
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